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EXCLUSIVITY—THE ROADBLOCK TO DEMOCRACY? 
SHUBHA GHOSH* 
I.  THE IDENTITY CRISIS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Does the institution of property lead to democracy?  This is the question 
that Professor Rose addresses in the 2005 Childress Lecture,1  to which this 
Article is a response.  Unless one adopts a very mechanistic relationship 
between property rights and government, the immediate response to the 
question should be a firm “no.”  The problem is that the question does not 
specify the social, economic, and legal institutions through which property 
rights function and seemingly ignores the “social embeddedness” of law.2  As a 
result, it may not be possible to separate the institution of property from 
democracy.  If one measure of the efficacy of property is the ability of 
democratic institutions to protect property rights,3 then it is just as sensible to 
ask whether democracy promotes the institution of property, or whether 
democracy and property can be promoted harmoniously. 
Despite its limitations, this question is valuable because of its ability to 
provoke.  Professor Rose uses the question to evaluate the Washington 
Consensus,4 promoted by key international organizations like the World Bank 
and the World Trade Organization, that the rule of law protecting property and 
 
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law. 
 1. Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691 
(2006). 
 2. For a discussion of social embeddedness with specific applications to technology and 
intellectual property, see MARK WARSCHAUER, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION 202–05 
(2003). 
 3. For a discussion of the role of democratic institutions and governance in protecting 
property, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
352 (1992), which presents Madisonian positions on the role of the government in protecting 
rights, including the right to property, and GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 268–69 (1991), which presents arguments about property and 
democracy particularly stemming from John Calhoun.  For a discussion of the problems of 
defining democracy, let alone implementing democratic institutions, see GERRY MACKIE, 
DEMOCRACY DEFENDED 424–25 (2003), which summarizes arguments about democracy and the 
public good. 
 4. Rose, supra note 1, at 691–92. 
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contract is a prerequisite to economic and political development.5  Professor 
Rose also provokes us to reconsider the meaning and function of intellectual 
property law, a central item in the agenda of the Washington Consensus.6  
Addressing the connection between property and democracy permits a more 
coherent understanding of intellectual property.  In turn, the refined 
understanding of intellectual property illustrates why democracy may not 
inevitably follow from a strong institution of property. 
Attempting to understand intellectual property’s connection to democracy 
reveals a crisis of identity for the field of intellectual property.  Many people, 
both within and outside the field, question whether it is meaningful to 
characterize intellectual property as property.7  The term “intellectual 
property” is of relatively recent vintage,8 and the equating of patent, copyright, 
trademark, and other doctrines with real and personal property does not fully 
capture their complex historical and doctrinal roots.  At the same time, turning 
patent, copyright, trademark, and the rest into orphans from the property 
family creates the vexing problem of identifying the appropriate adoptive 
parents.  Tort law does not completely fill the bill because compensation for 
injury describes only one dimension of the goals of patent and copyright, for 
instance.9  While patents and copyrights do regulate the marketplace, leaving 
the orphans at the doorstep of competition law would ignore the long-running 
squabble with antitrust.10  Perhaps, as one author has suggested, we should 
 
 5. See generally CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
AGREEMENTS: GLOBALIZING LAW THROUGH SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 27–29 
(2000) (describing role of law in globalization); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7–17 (2003) (analyzing structure of 
the World Trade Organization and intellectual property agreements). 
 6. Rose, supra note 1, at 692–94.  See generally MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE 
DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 125–39 
(1998) (describing the political background to the promotion of the World Trade Organization 
and Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). 
 7. For an analysis of the current state of the debate, see Mark A. Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033–39 (2005), which discusses 
property rhetoric in intellectual property law. 
 8. Id. at 1033–34. 
 9. Id. at 1072 (discussing an alternative in which intellectual property is treated as a species 
of tort law). 
 10. For a summary of this squabble, and a proposed resolution, see Michael A. Carrier, 
Resolving the Patent–Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 
1049–53 (2003).  On this point, it is interesting to note that one of the first leading casebooks on 
the subject of patents, copyright, trademarks, and related doctrines was EDMUND W. KITCH & 
HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS: CASES, MATERIALS, 
AND NOTES ON UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND PATENTS 
(1972).  In 1998, several years later, the fifth edition of the book was entitled Intellectual 
Property and Unfair Competition.  EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (5th ed. 1998). 
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simply treat patent, copyright, trademark, and other doctrines as statutory 
fields, a solution that avoids the question of what these separate statutory areas 
have in common.11  The problem is so vexing, and the identity crisis so 
profound, that one proposal is to replace the term “intellectual property” with 
the noncommittal initials “IP.”12  In light of this consternation, the answer to 
the question posed by Professor Rose may be very simple with respect to 
intellectual property: even if the institution of property does lead to democracy, 
intellectual property does not fit into the equation because intellectual property 
simply is not property. 
This answer, however, ignores an important insight for understanding 
intellectual property to be gained from addressing Professor Rose’s question.  
Analyzing intellectual property in terms of the relationship between property 
and democracy allows us to appreciate the relationship between the legal 
structure of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and related doctrine and property 
more broadly.  Professor Rose identifies four roles for property in promoting 
democracy: recognition, deregulation, divestment, and enablement.13  
Intellectual property fits into each of these four roles, as I demonstrate in 
Section II of this Paper.  The observation that intellectual property fulfills each 
of these roles suggests that there may be a family resemblance between what is 
called intellectual property and other types of property.  This family 
resemblance cannot be ignored by either orphaning intellectual property or by 
reducing it to its bare initials.  In other words, Professor Rose’s analysis of 
how property can shape democracy provides an understanding of intellectual 
property that connects the field to real and personal property.  At the same 
time, a careful analysis of how intellectual property can fail to promote 
democracy reveals why the broader category of property may fail to lead to 
democracy.  The failure, I conclude, arises from property rights, whether of the 
real, personal, or intellectual species, being defined too exclusively.  In short, 
the argument in this Paper has two parts.  First, Professor Rose’s analysis of 
the relationship between property and democracy helps to understand how 
intellectual property can be understood as property.  Second, identifying the 
ways in which intellectual property can promote democracy helps to isolate an 
important reason for the failure of property to lead to democracy: property 
rights, too broadly defined, lead to exclusivity. 
This two-part argument is developed as follows.  In Section II, I show how 
intellectual property fits into each of Professor Rose’s categories of 
privatization: recognition, deregulation, divestment, and enablement.  In 
Section III, I show how intellectual property rights too broadly defined can 
lead to exclusivity, a roadblock to democracy.  In Section IV, I derive three 
 
 11. See Lemley, supra note 7, at 1075. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Rose, supra note 1, at 694–98. 
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lessons to temper the claim that the institution of property is a prerequisite for 
democracy.  The three lessons pertain to the design of political, market, and 
social institutions that would promote the harmonious development of property 
rights and democracy. 
II.  THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN PRIVATIZATION 
The first quarter of Professor Rose’s paper identifies the mechanism 
through which property can lead to democracy.14  The more interesting 
question of why property is crucial to the promotion of democracy is the 
central question for the last three-quarters of the paper.  I will follow the order 
of Professor Rose’s argument by addressing in this next section how 
intellectual property can lead to democracy; the “why,” or perhaps more 
accurately, the “why not” question will be the focus of Section III. 
From the academic and policy debate over property and democracy, 
Professor Rose distills four ways in which property is deemed to secure 
democracy: recognition, deregulation, divestment, and enablement.15  Each is a 
distinct mechanism to implement privatization, or the shifting of “assets and 
economic decision-making away from the political arena and into the hands of 
individuals or private corporations.”16  Even though Professor Rose identifies 
enablement as the key mechanism to explain how intellectual property 
functions,17 I make the case in this section that each of the four categories has 
application to intellectual property.  Professor Rose’s four mechanisms can be 
understood as part of a theory of property grounded in the values of democratic 
governance.  Situating intellectual property within these four mechanisms 
locates it within a democratic theory of property.  This move is helpful to 
establish the proposition that intellectual property perhaps can correctly be 
described as property, once property is appropriately understood.  For the rest 
of this section, I will demonstrate how intellectual property fits into Professor 
Rose’s four categories, starting with enablement, the category within which 
Rose places intellectual property,18 and then addressing the remaining three: 
recognition, deregulation, and divestment, in that order. 
A. Intellectual Property As Enablement 
Enablement is a mechanism implemented by the state to define property 
rights when rights cannot be created or enforced through extra-legal means.  
Intellectual property is an example of enablement.19  By providing a legal right 
 
 14. Id. at 694–701. 
 15. Id. at 694–98. 
 16. Id. at 691. 
 17. Id. at 697–98. 
 18. Rose, supra note 1, at 697. 
 19. See id. 
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to exclude to the creator of inventions or expressive works, the state allows the 
creator to prevent the copying of the work, limit its distribution, and realize 
rents from the artificial scarcity of the work in the marketplace.  Absent the 
state-created right to exclude, the creator’s work could be easily duplicated and 
every consumer could be allocated as many copies of the work as desired.  The 
market scarcity made possible by legal protection allows for allocation based 
on the consumer’s willingness to pay as measured by price. 
The mechanism of enablement serves not only to create markets, but also 
to permit private management of resources.20  As Professor Rose states, 
tradeable emission permits are an example of enablement.21  Tradeable 
emission permits not only create markets for pollution, but also allow the 
owner of the permits to decide how to allocate resources between production 
and pollution abatement.22  Intellectual property also functions as a tool for 
private resource management.  Patents, for example, are sometimes argued to 
be a tool for prospecting, the grant of exclusivity allowing the patent owner to 
develop and improve her invention.23  The private management of resources 
has implications not only for the institution of markets, but also for democracy.  
Private management of resources permits decentralized decision-making and 
governance structures.  Once the state institutes property rights, rights holders 
are free to exercise the rights within the scope defined by the state.  To make 
enablement a meaningful mechanism, however, the rights holders also must 
have a say in how the rights are enforced and defined.24  If the power to 
enforce and define rights rests solely with the state, then enablement would be 
a meaningless way to privatize economic decision-making. 
While certain dimensions of intellectual property can be understood as 
enablement, other dimensions are less comprehensible under this theory.  
Digital rights management is a technological means of protecting the subject 
matter of intellectual property.25  Through digital rights management, the 
creator can prevent copying of her work by encryption.  However, legal 
 
 20. See generally YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 6–7 (2d ed. 
1997) (describing ways in which property rights aid in managing and exchanging resources). 
 21. Rose, supra note 1, 698. 
 22. See James L. Hufman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental Protection, 55 MONT. L. 
REV. 425, 432 (1994). 
 23. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 270–71 (1977). 
 24. See BARZEL, supra note 20, at 88–89 (describing need for balance of power in 
delineation and definition of rights); see also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND 
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 37–43 (1970) 
(discussing the role of voice as an alternative to exit); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 243 (1993) (discussing the benefits of deliberative democracy). 
 25. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 166–70 (2001) (explaining digital rights 
management). 
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protection, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),26 is also 
needed to ensure that the encryption is not circumvented.27  The DMCA, often 
described as para-copyright, does not fit into the enablement mechanism.  By 
implementing legislation like the DMCA, the state is not creating property 
rights, but protecting privately defined rights over intellectual property.  The 
state is not so much enabling rights, but implementing technologically defined 
rights.  The result is two layers of rights defined through both technology and 
law.  The example of the DMCA illustrates that with intellectual property, the 
state acts as more than just an enabler of rights.  As I show in the remainder of 
this section, intellectual property can be understood also through recognition, 
deregulation, and divestment. 
B. Intellectual Property As Recognition 
While the enablement mechanism entails the state’s creation of property 
rights, the recognition mechanism entails the state’s creation of institutions that 
permit the giving of public notice of property ownership.  The creation of 
public notice, such as through a titling system, facilitates the exchange of 
property, the development of markets, and the accumulation of assets that 
allow property owners to engage more broadly in civil society.28  In some 
ways, the recognition mechanism shares many features of the enablement 
mechanism.  Both can lead to the development of markets.  Both allow for the 
more effective management of property.  A key difference is that the 
recognition mechanism assists the enforcement of pre-existing property rights 
and is agnostic as to the definition and source of these rights. 
Intellectual property fits within the recognition mechanism.  While patent 
and copyright are generally accepted as statutory rights, and therefore the 
creation of the state, other types of intellectual property, such as trade secrets 
and trademarks, have roots in the common law.  Furthermore, all types of 
intellectual property originate in a Lockean theory of property under which 
rights are created by the imposition of the owner’s labor on things in the 
world.29  The Lockean, or labor, theory of intellectual property informs not 
only its common law foundations, but also the interpretation of statutory rights 
of patent and copyright.  From the Lockean perspective, intellectual property 
 
 26. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–
1205, 1301–1322, and 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000)). 
 27. LITMAN, supra note 25, at 27, 167. 
 28. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN 
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 17–20 (2000); see also Bernadette Atuahene, Land 
Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the Potential to Deepen Democracy, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
761, 762 (2006). 
 29. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 297–300 
(1988). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] EXCLUSIVITY—THE ROADBLOCK TO DEMOCRACY? 805 
rights exist before the state.30  Consequently, the state, through intellectual 
property law, acts to recognize, rather than create property.31 
I should point out that not everyone accepts the Lockean theory of 
property.32  For example, in several publications, I have advocated for a 
regulatory theory of property, one that perhaps fits more closely with the 
enablement, deregulatory, and divestment mechanisms.33  Nonetheless, the 
Lockean theory has broad acceptance and needs to be addressed within the 
four mechanisms.  Furthermore, the recognition mechanism is consistent with 
a regulatory theory of intellectual property.  Under the regulatory theory, the 
titling function of intellectual property serves as a means of regulating property 
rights among various owners and users.  The possible inconsistency between 
the regulatory theory and the recognition mechanism arises from the source of 
intellectual property.  While the recognition mechanism is agnostic as to 
source, the regulatory theory identifies the state as the primary source of 
intellectual property rights. 
The history of intellectual property illustrates the recognition mechanism 
of property.  Patent law’s roots, for instance, are traced to the patent statute 
enacted by the Venetian Republic in 1474.34  The Venetian statute permitted 
any inventor within Venice to obtain a limited property right in a new and 
ingenious invention upon its registration with a central registry.35  The purpose 
of this registry was to give notice of the invention and the inventor’s claims.36  
Similarly, the early English history of copyright illustrates a private 
registration system among members of the printer’s guild, known as the 
Stationer’s Company, to allocate the right to make copies of an author’s 
manuscript among its members.37  While this registry was privately 
administered, the notice function of copyright served to determine which 
publisher had the right to copy a particular manuscript.38  The notice function 
of intellectual property continues today with the publication requirement for 
patents, the registration requirement for the initiation of a copyright suit, the 
federal registration of trademarks, and the registration of domain names.  The 
domain name system is particularly noteworthy because of its echoes of 
 
 30. See id. at 300. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 330. 
 33. See generally Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 
413–21 (2003) (arguing for the theory of democratic governance). 
 34. Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to 
Philadelphia 9 (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 04-12, Aug. 
2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=585661. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A 
LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 21 (1991). 
 38. Id. 
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copyright’s early history.  In the United States, domain name registry is 
privatized with regulation by the Internet Corporation for Applied Names and 
Numbers (I.C.A.N.N.), a private corporation to whom the authority was 
derogated by Congress in the late Nineties.39 
The recognition mechanism can also be seen in the doctrinal structure of 
intellectual property.  The subject of intellectual property can be protected 
through private means, such as technological protections and secrecy.  For 
example, Leonardo da Vinci famously wrote his inventions in code and 
maintained secrecy in the disclosure of his ideas.40  Secrecy is quite common 
in contemporary industrial settings, and with the rise of digitalization, 
encryption is an effective means for protecting information.41  Patents and 
copyrights, appropriately defined, can serve as an efficient alternative to 
secrecy and technological protection measures.42 
Patents, for example, grant a strong right to exclude in exchange for 
complete disclosure of the invention to the public.43  While copyright 
protection does not have the broad disclosure requirement of patent law, a 
work must be registered as a condition of bringing a suit for copyright 
infringement.44  Furthermore, both the patent and copyright systems contain 
formalized rules for registering licenses and other contractual interests based in 
intellectual property.45  These formalized rules provide notice of ownership to 
subsequent users of the protected know-how. 
Intellectual property illustrates not only the enablement mechanism, but 
also the recognition mechanism.  Whether recognition is a means of providing 
notice of pre-political rights (as implied by the Lockean theory of property) or 
a means for property regulation (as implied by the regulatory theory), 
intellectual property serves many of the titling functions Professor Rose 
 
 39. See A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 UNIV. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 2–8 (presenting I.C.A.N.N. in a nutshell); see also MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE 
ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 80 (2002). 
 40. See MICHAEL WHITE, LEONARDO: THE FIRST SCIENTIST 131–32 (2000) (describing 
dark side of da Vinci, who wrote his scientific notes in secret code to prevent plagiarism and 
theft). 
 41. Aaron Perkins, Comment, Encryption Use: Law and Anarchy on the Digital Frontier, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1625, 1626–27 (2005). 
 42. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE 
COMMON LAW 24–31 (1988) (describing the rationale based in the economics of information for 
creating property rights in information to avoid the problem of secrecy). 
 43. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (inventions patentable); § 102 (conditions for patentability; 
novelty and loss of right to patent); § 103 (conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject 
matter), § 111 (application for a patent); §112 (describing the specification required in a patent 
application); § 113 (when drawings shall be included in application); § 122(a) (confidentiality of 
patent applications); §122(b) (publication of patent applications). 
 44. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 411–412 (2000). 
 45. See § 111 (on the patent application); § 409 (on the copyright application). 
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identifies in other forms of privatization.46  Based on the recognition 
mechanism, the case can be made that intellectual property fits within a 
broader theory of property and privatization.  The case becomes stronger when 
considering the deregulation and the divestment mechanisms. 
C. Intellectual Property As Deregulation 
Deregulation, following Professor Rose’s definition, is a mechanism for 
relaxing governmental controls over business activities.47  The assumption is 
that relaxing governmental controls will unleash private economic activity and 
more efficient use of resources. Like the enablement and recognition 
mechanisms, the deregulation mechanism facilitates private decision-making 
and the creation of market institutions. 
On way through which intellectual property has been taken from 
governmental control is the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, which removed 
restrictions on the patenting of inventions that were the product of federal 
government funding.48  The impetus for the Bayh–Dole Act came from a need 
by universities and private industry for the fostering of university–industry 
collaborations.49  While the federal government provided a very important 
source of financing for early research and development in inventive and 
innovative activities, the marketing and development of these activities were 
argued to be hindered by the inability to patent, or otherwise protect through 
intellectual property law, the fruits of university research.50  By removing the 
restriction on patenting that came with the government funding, the Bayh–Dole 
Act removed the disincentives for university–industry collaboration and 
stimulated spin-off activities that are evident among many major university 
centers, whether in Silicon Valley, Route 128, or areas near major land grant 
institutions.51 
Like many types of deregulation, the Bayh–Dole Act has been 
controversial.  A salient criticism is that the Act, by fostering university-
industry collaboration, has caused many universities to move away from their 
core mission of basic research and education.52 
Furthermore, the Act has had unexpected effects on patent law itself, 
narrowing the scope of the doctrine of experimental use, which is an important 
limitation on patent rights for the purpose of research and experimentation.  In 
 
 46. See Rose, supra note 1, at 694–98. 
 47. See id. at 695–96. 
 48. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 94–98 (1999). 
 49. See Rai, supra note 48, at 96–98. 
 50. Id. at 97. 
 51. See generally id. at 97–98. 
 52. See Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. 
Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 415–16 (2000). 
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Madey v. Duke University, for example, the Federal Circuit seemed to imply 
that universities, because of their engagement in commercial activities, may 
lose the benefit of the experimental use doctrine except in very narrow 
circumstances.53  More importantly for the argument of this Paper, the 
treatment of intellectual property under the Bayh–Dole Act raises an important 
question: Did the Act actually deregulate intellectual property or enable it 
within the context of federally funded research? 
The answer to that question rests on one’s conception of intellectual 
property.  If intellectual property is solely the creation of the state, then the 
Bayh–Dole Act arguably enabled property rights in a previously excluded area.  
If intellectual property is derived from the imposition of human labor on the 
world, and therefore existed before the creation of the state, then the Bayh–
Dole Act deregulated the patent system by permitting property rights where 
they no longer existed.  The history of intellectual property supports the 
conclusion of deregulation. 
What we call patents and copyrights were originally grants from the 
sovereign.54  The crown would issue a “letters-patent,” or an open grant, to 
individuals who had secured an innovative product for distribution within the 
country.55  Copyright, which originally started as a form of private regulation 
among members of the Stationer’s Company, became a grant from the 
sovereign for the exclusive right to publish a manuscript.56  The system of 
sovereign grants came under attack during the Elizabethan Age, and the 
Parliament in 1624 under the reign of King James I enacted the Statute of 
Monopolies, which limited the sovereign’s power to make open grants.57  The 
Statute of Monopolies became the basis for contemporary patent and copyright 
law under which individuals are given exclusive rights in inventions and 
writings upon satisfying the statutory requirements.58  There is an instructive 
parallel between the origins of patent and copyright and the development of 
corporate charters.59  Corporate formation was originally a matter of a 
 
 53. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 54. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN 
WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 147–48 (1973); KENNETH W. DOBYNS, A HISTORY OF THE 
EARLY PATENT OFFICE: THE PATENT OFFICE PONY 7–10 (1994). 
 55. Figeuroa v. U.S., 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 148 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (stating that the word “patent” 
derives from the English phrase “letters patent,” which were grants by the sovereign to an 
individual); DOBYNS, supra note 54 at 7–8. 
 56. Copyright History, http://www.patent.gov.uk/copy/history/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
 57. See Chris R. Kyle, ‘But A New Button to an Old Coat: The Enactment of the Statute of 
Monopolies, 21 James I cap.3, J. LEGAL HIST. Dec. 1998, at 203, 205–17. 
 58. See id. at 203. 
 59. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 11–16 
(1991) (describing development of incorporation in the United States).  For a fuller discussion of 
the parallel noted in text, see Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the 
Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1317–18 (2004). 
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sovereign grant.60  With the shift from a monarchical to democratic forms of 
government, corporate chartering became a legislative function.  For example, 
in the nineteenth century, corporations in the United States were formed by 
special legislation.61  The incorporation movement sought successfully to make 
the act of incorporation the product of private decision-making prescribed by 
statutory requirements.  Modern patents and copyrights, like corporate 
charters, result no longer from a grant by a legislature, but from a private act 
permitted by statute.62  In this way, patents and copyrights can be understood 
as the product of deregulation, or a relaxation of governmental controls over 
private decision-making. 
Intellectual property’s role as a deregulatory mechanism can be seen in its 
transformation from a sovereign grant to an instrument of private economic 
decision-making.  Just as a citizen can choose to form a corporation, a citizen 
can decide whether to pursue the protections afforded by patent and copyright 
law.  Therefore, the Bayh–Dole Act’s status as deregulation should not be 
surprising.  Instead of recognizing or enabling property rights, the Act liberated 
the exercise of choice to those who had received federal funding and sought to 
patent its fruits.  Although the consequences of the Act are controversial, its 
deregulatory function, as well as that of intellectual property itself, should not 
be. 
D. Intellectual Property As Divestment 
The divestment mechanism entails the transfer of ownership over key 
industries and infrastructure from governmental agencies to private citizens.63  
While the privatization of key utilities, such as water and electricity, are fairly 
well recognized examples of divestment, the example of intellectual property 
as divestment may not be.64  To understand intellectual property as a form of 
divestment requires an appreciation of the government’s role in the creation of 
cultural products and innovation.65 
Divestment involves shifting the locus of certain activities from the state to 
private industry.66  Similarly, the creation of intellectual property moves the 
locus of creative activity from the state to private individuals.  Citizen–creators 
can make use of intellectual property to keep others from making unauthorized 
 
 60. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1433 (1987). 
 61. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, at 11–13. 
 62. See id. at 13 (describing modern view of corporation as a means of private ordering). 
 63. See Rose, supra note 1, at 696. 
 64. See generally MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE 
PUBLIC GOOD (2002) (describing traditional forms of privatization as devolution); Shubha 
Ghosh, Copyright As Privatization: The Case of Model Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 653, 655–57 
(2004) (proposing that copyright can be understood as a type of privatization). 
 65. See Ghosh, supra note 64, at 663–68. 
 66. Rose, supra note 1, at 696. 
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copies of the products of their creativity.  Put more strongly, intellectual 
property gives the citizen–creator the right to police the marketplace to prevent 
the making of illegitimate imitations of works and act as private attorneys 
general to enjoin acts of infringement.  In this way, intellectual property is a 
form of divestment. 
An illustrative example of copyright as divestment is provided by the case 
of J.S.G. Boggs, an American artist who was the subject of criminal 
prosecution because of his artistic depiction of U.S. currency.67  Boggs’s work 
depicts various denominations of currency.68  While these depictions clearly 
are not currency, they have value as artwork and are accepted in exchange for 
goods and services.69  The problem is that while Boggs’s artwork is quite 
different from counterfeit money, he has been arrested for counterfeiting in 
England and in Australia.70  The Boggs saga illustrates that at the heart of 
intellectual property lies a question of authority.  The U.S. treasury creates a 
particular representation of money.  Under federal law, no private citizen can 
make a representation of money.71  Even though Boggs’s exchange of his 
currency portraits for goods and services is a barter exchange, the exchange is 
seen as too close a substitute for an exchange of goods and services for 
authorized currency.72 
By giving itself the exclusive right to represent money in a particular form, 
the state retains the authority to determine what representations of money are 
legitimate and how transactions can occur.  In theory, the state could assign the 
right to make currency to private parties (as, for example, happens with the 
artwork on postage stamps),73 but has not done so for the practical reason of 
retaining control over the stock of money in the economy.74  Boggs’s artwork 
challenges the state’s exclusive authority to represent money and demonstrates 
intellectual property’s potential role as a form of divestment. 
While the state retains the authority to represent money and control its 
copying, the state has vested the right to create and control copying to private 
citizens in other instances.  For example, the King James Bible was a large 
government project from the seventeenth century.75  As an alternative to the 
government project, the state could have allowed a private organization to 
 
 67. LAWRENCE WESCHLER, BOGGS: A COMEDY OF VALUES 4–5 (1999). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 4–5, 120–21. 
 71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 474–475 (2000). 
 72. See WESCHLER, supra note 67, at 4–5. 
 73. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 60 (1976). 
 74. Nathan K. Cummings, The Counterfeit Buck Stops Here: National Security Issues in the 
Redesign of U.S. Currency, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 539, 542–43, 547–49 (1999). 
 75. See ADAM NICOLSON, GOD’S SECRETARIES: THE MAKING OF THE KING JAMES BIBLE 
63–70 (2003). 
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make the translation and allowed the private entity to control copying through 
intellectual property law.  In fact, most creative and expressive works are 
created through private means under the auspices of copyright law. 
A particularly striking example of the state’s divestment of activities 
through copyright is provided by the copyright treatment of laws and statutes.  
In the United Kingdom, the copying and distribution of parliamentary 
legislation is controlled through a crown copyright.76  In the United States, 
federal legislation and other federal governmental materials are not protected 
by copyright and therefore can be copied and distributed freely.77  Federal and 
state judicial opinions are also exempt from copyright protection.78  
Controversy has arisen over the treatment of state legislative materials.  In one 
case, a federal appeals court recognized copyright in privately drafted legal 
code, but concluded that once the privately drafted code is enacted into public 
law, the copyright is extinguished.79  This last example shows how even the 
drafting of legislation can be derogated to private individuals who can make 
use of copyright law to protect the draft before enactment by the state. 
By shifting the locus of creative and innovative activities from the 
authority of the government to the authority of private citizens, intellectual 
property is a form of divestment.  This conclusion does not imply that 
creativity and innovation occurs only within governmental agencies or solely 
under the sponsorship of the state.  Rather, intellectual property has been used 
to derogate certain governmental functions to private entities.  The artist 
Boggs’s run-in with the law demonstrates the limits of divestment.80  Boggs’s 
painted currency also makes evident that at the heart of intellectual property is 
the tension between state authority and private authority in the creative 
process. 
E. Intellectual Property and the Democratic Theory of Property 
Professor Rose’s distillation of privatization into four types serves not only 
to summarize arguments about the relation between property and democracy, 
but also to help formulate a theory of property grounded in democratic theory.  
The mechanisms of recognition, deregulation, divestment, and enablement 
show how property functions within a democratic society.81  Professor Rose’s 
implicit functional theory of property also has room for intellectual property, 
whose many uses include the recognition of property rights, the deregulation of 
 
 76. WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS, AND ALLIED RIGHTS 530–33 (5th ed. 2003). 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000). 
 78. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 252–54 (1888); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 
Pet.) 591, 666 (1834). 
 79. Veeck v. S. Building Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 80. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Rose, supra note 1 at 694–98. 
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government control over rights, the divestment of creative activities, and the 
enablement of property rights.  In response to the identity crisis bedeviling 
intellectual property theory, the functional theory of property offers a basis for 
concluding that intellectual property perhaps can accurately be understood as 
property, once property is appropriately understood. 
But the case for intellectual property within the functional theory of 
property has an important implication for the question of whether property 
leads to democracy.  The establishment of property rights may fail in the goal 
of achieving democracy.  Professor Rose provides several reasons for this 
failure.82  By focusing on the connection between intellectual property and 
democracy, I propose a major explanation for the failure: exclusivity.  I 
analyze this proposition in the next section. 
III.  EXCLUSIVITY AS A ROADBLOCK TO DEMOCRACY 
The four mechanisms discussed in Section II explain how property can 
lead to democracy through privatization.  The more important question is why.  
Professor Rose presents five theories for why the institution of property rights 
can lead to democracy: the priority theory, the power-spreading theory, the 
distraction theory, the symbolic theory, and the civilizing theory.83  Each 
theory, in isolation or in conjunction with some of the other theories, offers a 
causal narrative for how property rights lead to democracy.  The case of 
intellectual property allows us to isolate a common weakness in each of these 
five narratives.  My thesis is that property rights can fail to lead to democracy 
if the rights create too strong a power to exclude.  Examples from intellectual 
property support the conclusion that exclusivity is the source of the problem. 
Historian Sean Wilentz describes property as a “dazzling abstraction.”84  
Property’s dazzle is reflected in its complicated role in the development of 
American democracy.  Property can be an impediment to democracy when 
property ownership is made a condition of civic participation.85  Property can 
be antithetical to democracy when property rights are established over people, 
making status as property an insurmountable stigma against civic 
recognition.86  At the same time, an expansion of property ownership, through 
more equal distribution of resources, has often been touted as the key to civic 
engagement and democratic participation.87  Inappropriately designed property 
systems, as gauged by distribution and the scope of what counts as property, 
 
 82. Id. at 709–10. 
 83. See id. at 701–20. 
 84. SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 343 
(2005). 
 85. Id. at 27–28. 
 86. See id. at 226–27. 
 87. See id. at 485 (discussing how people could be “turned into great defenders of property” 
when property is diffused broadly). 
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are undoubtedly hostile to democracy.  The problem for the argument that 
property leads to democracy is defining property rights appropriately.  The 
case of intellectual property demonstrates the various dimensions of the 
problem. 
Intellectual property’s identity crisis stems in part from a recognition that 
the subject of intellectual property is different from land and chattels, the 
subject of real and personal property respectively.88 
The recognized difference is one of the abilities of desirability for creating 
exclusionary rights for intellectual property as strong as those that exist for real 
and personal property.  For some commentators, intellectual property is no 
different from real and personal property.89  All three, according to this 
perspective, require a strong right to exclude in order to facilitate private 
investment and market exchange.90  Other commentators recognize that the 
logic of intellectual property requires some degree of exclusion, but given the 
nature of information and the processes of creativity and innovation, too strong 
a right to exclude can inhibit the goals of progress.91  Yet another perspective 
questions the desirability of any right to exclude, urging that attempting to 
exclude ideas would be tantamount to excluding the atmosphere or sunlight.92  
The key lesson is that the debate about intellectual property is over exclusivity.  
Similarly, the connection between property and democracy can also be 
understood as a question of the value of exclusivity as a means of obtaining 
democracy. 
In oral commentary on the ideas leading up to this Paper, Professor Rose 
questioned whether I was correct in narrowing intellectual property to the right 
to exclude.  As she correctly pointed out, the goal of the intellectual property 
system is the spread and progress of knowledge.93  Therefore, rights to alienate 
and transfer are also an important part of intellectual property.  The problem is 
that the debate over intellectual property, as summarized in the previous 
paragraph, is about the scope of the right to exclude under intellectual property 
law.  Furthermore, rights to alienate and transfer are subsidiary to the right to 
 
 88. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 7, at 1034–35. 
 89. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 108, 112 (1990). 
 90. Id. (advocating a strong right to exclude in intellectual property). 
 91. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 19–21 (2001). 
 92. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Isaac McPherson, in BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 708, 712–13 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950) (1944). 
 93. As I understood it, Professor Rose’s point was an articulation of her argument that 
property rights do not necessarily imply “despotic dominion” by the property rights holder.  See 
Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 631 
(1998).  My point in this Paper is to demonstrate how the right to exclude within intellectual 
property, as well as other systems of property, requires limitations in order to be consistent with 
the democratic theory of property.  Put a bit more strongly, those who espouse a strong right to 
exclude are working against the creation of democratic institutions. 
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exclude.  Patents, copyright, trademarks, trade secrets, and related doctrines 
give the rights-holder only the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the object of the right.94  The rights-holder’s ability to make, use, or sell 
the object of the right can be limited as well.  For example, the patent owner’s 
right to practice an invention can be regulated or even prevented under the 
state’s police power.95  The logic of the intellectual property system is that the 
right to exclude facilitates the rights-holder’s ability to make, use, or sell the 
object of the right without the fear of imitation once the object is marketed.  
Whether this freedom from imitation also entails freedom from market 
competition, or other interferences with the value of the right, rests largely on 
how broadly the scope to exclude is construed.  Therefore, it is perfectly 
appropriate to focus solely on the right to exclude in the context of intellectual 
property.  Furthermore, by focusing on the right to exclude, the centrality of 
exclusivity to the connection between property and democracy can be more 
carefully explored and understood. 
The rest of this section identifies the weaknesses to the five theories of the 
property–democracy connection with examples from intellectual property.  The 
examples show that an important problem for the design of property rights is 
the proper scope of exclusivity. 
A. The Priority of Intellectual Property and the Effects of Exclusivity 
The importance of property as a touchstone for democracy rests in its 
primacy.  Property existed before politics and before the vagaries of the state, 
and therefore it reflects a natural order based on the abilities of the individual 
property owner.  Once property is established, then so are the rights, capacities, 
and identity of the citizen who becomes free to be involved in civic society.96  
So goes the priority theory of property and democracy.  With its roots in the 
ideas of John Locke, the priority theory offers an explanation for property and 
an explanation for democratic governance: property is prior to, and necessary 
for, government, and government serves to protect property.97 
Given the Lockean foundations for the priority theory, it should not be 
difficult to imagine the argument for the primacy of intellectual property for 
democracy.  Even though land and inventions are clearly different, the 
argument for intellectual property as prior to, and necessary for, democratic 
governance is not difficult to make.  Democratic governance rests on the 
 
 94. See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (identifying right to exclude as “the hallmark of a protected property 
interest”). 
 95. See Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347–48 (1881) (holding that patent law did not 
displace police power). 
 96. Rose, supra note 1, at 701–02 (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
315–17 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690)). 
 97. Id. 
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exchange of ideas.98  Ideas need to be expressed in order for this exchange to 
have substance, since freely floating ideas are not negotiable.  Copyright 
provides rights in the expression of ideas that can serve as the currency for the 
marketplace of ideas.99 
The democratic case for patents may be more difficult to see until one 
recognizes the role of technological development in the growth of the state and 
the economy.  To avoid the dangers of the state regulating and monitoring 
economic development, rights in inventions need to be allocated before the 
state is formed, and then the state’s subsequent role in protecting property 
rights in inventions will mirror the Lockean vision of protection for real 
property.100  Even though Locke did not talk about intellectual property, the 
extension of his ideas from the priority of real property to the coequal priority 
of intellectual property follows from the primacy of labor as a means of 
defining the rights and identities of the citizen in a democratic government. 
The problem is that if the right being defined is a right to exclude, then it 
becomes very difficult to imagine how property rights are prior to the state.  
More importantly, it becomes harder to understand why the state should 
sanction pre-existing property rights rather than engage in the distribution or 
the redefinition of rights to serve potentially to correct the adverse effects of 
exclusivity on democracy.  I address these two points separately as potentially 
overlapping criticisms of the priority theory. 
The definition problem for property is well illustrated by the conundrums 
within intellectual property as to what subject matter the right to exclude 
attaches.  In patent law, the trend in the United States since the Patent Act of 
1952 is to extend the right to exclude to “anything under the sun that is made 
by man.”101  But even within this broad reach, there are hesitations.  European 
critics question the extension of patent rights to software, raising the specter of 
anti-competitive effects on the software industry and the many industries that 
are software-based.102  The United States, however, maintains its broad 
approach, arguing, in perhaps true Lockean fashion, that any harms that arise 
 
 98. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global 
Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 297–98 (1998) (stating that an “exchange of ideas and free flow of 
information [are] necessary to spur, consolidate and enhance democratic governance”). 
 99. See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the 
Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of 
the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 942–45 (2003) (discussing the relationship between 
copyright law and the First Amendment). 
 100. See Hughes, supra note 29, at 296–330, for a discussion of the Lockean theory of 
property; see also ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION CONTROL 
103–19 (2001). 
 101. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
816 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:799 
from the exercise of property rights can be remedied through common law or 
other statutes.103  But even the United States on occasion backtracks from the 
position that patent rights can attach to anything that is man-made.  In 2000 the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office denied a patent to a “chimera,” a 
mixed animal–human cellular life form because, the agency concluded, 
property rights cannot attach to humans or human-like organisms.104  The 
limitation suggests that property rights may not be pre-political after all, and 
that the state can define rights in order to obtain other regulatory and social 
goals. 
The examples of software and chimeras illustrate one obvious chink in the 
armor of the priority theory.  If intellectual property rights exist prior to the 
state, how can they attach to inventions created after the formation of the state?  
The answer to this conundrum is that intellectual property rights are attaching 
to the exercise of human labor that exists before the state is created.  But not all 
human labor is treated equally under intellectual property law.  Copyright law, 
for example, grants a right to exclude only to original works of authorship.105  
The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated that originality cannot be based on 
the sweat of the brow.106  A property right in an expression attaches to creative 
elements of the expression, and it is only creators who can be copyright 
owners.  Copyright law makes distinction between artists, who bring their 
labor flowing from their creative genius to bear upon the world, and artisans, 
who engage in slavish labor with no creativity.107  While this distinction can be 
explained in the functional terms of copyright, it is far from clear how this 
determination of originality exists prior to the state.  Once again the debate 
over software illustrates the point.  Viewed at one time as purely a functional 
or utilitarian item, software rests squarely within the domain of copyright law 
with the recognition that software is a type of literary work.108  It is hard to 
imagine that the line between utilitarian and expressive works can be drawn 
independently of the state’s goal of promoting certain works, and industry, 
through copyright. 
The priority theory also ignores the state’s goal in redefining property 
rights to meet either distributional goals separate from copyright or the goals of 
intellectual property itself.  The copyright battles in particular industries 
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 104. Patent Application Is Disallowed As ‘Embracing’ Human Being, PAT. TRADEMARK & 
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illustrate the state’s role in redefining property rights.  When the film industry 
was confronted with the question of defining copyright when there were 
multiple contributors to a work, the state created the “work-for-hire” 
doctrine109 to vest ownership of the copyright in the employer.110  As new 
technologies arose for the transmittal of sound and video images, copyright 
law was adopted to deal with new methods of reproducing and distributing 
works and new citizens, such as performers, who had a stake in the 
enterprise.111  By defining new rights, the state was not simply enforcing pre-
existing rights, but adapting the system of rights to new institutions and 
environments.  It was also actively engaging in redrawing and redistributing 
the rents to be gained from new technologies.  The most striking example of 
this role of the state comes from the Internet.  In the Tasini112 case, the 
Supreme Court had to decide whether freelance writers had retained their 
rights to reproduce and distribute their works in a digital database when they 
transferred their works to publishers.113  The case involved a technical analysis 
of a provision of the Copyright Act, but at issue was how to allocate the 
economic benefits from Internet transmission between authors and 
publishers.114  The Court ruled in favor of the authors, and even though 
subsequent publishers were able to reacquire the rights via contract, it is hard 
to deny that the state was not engaged in the definition of rights, rather than the 
protection of rights that existed prior to the state.115 
The problem in each of these examples arises from the problem of 
exclusivity.  For new technologies and new inventions, the recurring question 
is who gets the right to exclude.  The allocation of this right is not determined 
 
 109. See Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 
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solely by an appeal to abstract labor or to an actual exercise of exclusion, but 
some determination of who should have the right to exclude.  The state, 
therefore, has to exercise some judgment in allocating rights beyond simply 
enforcing pre-existing rights.  Furthermore, the right to exclude may shift from 
one citizen to another as needed to promote certain industries and activities.  
Here, the state is acting to redistribute the right to exclude rather than simply 
enforce existing systems and assumptions about exclusion.  Given the 
importance of the state’s actions in defining and redefining intellectual 
property rights in the promotion of key industries in developed economies, it is 
hard to accept the argument that property is prior to the state and not a key 
instrument for how economies and industries are shaped by the state.  The 
salient question is how the right to exclude and the institutions that support it 
are to be drawn. 
B. Power Spreading and the Problem of Monopoly 
Under the power spreading theory, recognizing property rights broadly 
among citizens allows economic power to be spread more evenly across 
society and subsequently prevents political power from being concentrated.116  
Through broad property ownership, individuals can have opportunities to enter 
into profitable commercial activities, which permits the accumulation of 
wealth and of influence in the political process.  Put another way, property 
owners have a stake in society and a motivation to participate and counter 
oligarchy. 
The right to exclude may belie the power spreading theory.  If the right to 
exclude is spread broadly, then each citizen is given the equal and reciprocal 
right to exclude his neighbor.  But if the right to exclude is used collectively at 
the expense of a targeted group, then pernicious results will inevitably follow.  
The example from real property of racially restrictive covenants demonstrates 
the dangers.117  While there was some attempt to justify racially restrictive 
covenants on separate but equal grounds since the ability to restrict on race 
applied to all races, the reality of the covenants was their effect on the 
development of an African-American middle class in large segments of the 
United States during the first half of the twentieth century.118  The wide-spread 
allocation of property by itself did not lead to democracy because the right to 
exclude was used collectively to prevent the exercise of property rights by 
others.  Property was a weapon that permitted the monopolization of economic 
and political power rather than a tool that whittled it away. 
 
 116. See Rose, supra note 1, at 705. 
 117. See Carol M. Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 169, 
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 118. Id. at 170. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] EXCLUSIVITY—THE ROADBLOCK TO DEMOCRACY? 819 
In intellectual property, the power spreading theory is undermined in two 
ways.  First, since intellectual property rights are based on the products of 
one’s creative endeavors, the value of one’s intellectual property will largely 
depend upon one’s endowment of talent.  The recognition of talent will often 
rest on the tastes of the citizens of society and the rights of citizens not to 
patronize certain creators or vendors of creative output.119 
The lack of appreciation, in their time, for the talents of Herman Melville 
and of Vincent van Gogh as well as the suicide of the fledgling novelist John 
Kennedy Toole, whose novel A Confederacy of Dunces won a Pulitzer Prize 
and became a top seller posthumously,120 illustrates the whims of tastes.  
Therefore, the right to exclude under intellectual property will often come into 
conflict with the right to exclude by consumers.  The ownership of intellectual 
property may not lead to more active participation if market exclusion, which 
reflects the exclusivity of tastes, prevents the realization of value from one’s 
intellectual property. 
Furthermore, the right to exclude under intellectual property will inevitably 
be exercised in a collective fashion.  The collective use of the right to exclude 
under intellectual property reflects in part the law’s roots in the guild system.  
Copyright was originally a system of private regulation among the Stationer’s 
Company in England.121 Many features of patent law, including the original 
rules of duration and inventorship rules, reflect practices of apprenticeship in 
guilds.122  In the contemporary marketplace, intellectual property invariably is 
exercised in a collective fashion either through corporate entities to whom 
patents and copyrights are assigned as part of the employment relationship or 
to collective-rights organizations that serve to look out for the rights of 
performers and artists.  The right to exclude under intellectual property leads 
more often to the concentration of economic and political power than to its 
diffusion.  As with real property, the path to democracy requires as much 
restriction on the right to exclude as its broad recognition. 
C. Distraction and the Idols of the Intellectual Property Marketplace 
The distraction theory views the establishment of property rights and the 
consequent pursuit of wealth as taking citizens’ minds away from the bloody 
world of politics to the sanguine, peaceful world of beneficial exchange and 
 
 119. See TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE 130–31 (1998) (discussing 
the market for music); DAVID THROSBY, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 23–26 (2001) (describing 
demand for artistic works in terms of economic theory of utility). 
 120. Edwin McDowell, Publishing Manuscripts Posthumously, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1984, 
at C13. 
 121. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 122. See generally Nard & Morriss, supra note 34, at 10, 15–16 (discussing roots of patents in 
guild system). 
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the marketplace.123  Property, it is argued, turns savages into gentle 
shopkeepers, pursuers of political power into purveyors of goods and services 
for individual economic profit and the greater good. 
The saliency of this theory rests on its pedigree.  As Albert Hirschman has 
documented, the distraction theory was perhaps the primary defense of 
“capitalism before its triumph” and is echoed in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations.124  The problem with the theory is that it rests on a simplistic 
separation between the quest for power and the quest for wealth.  The 
argument assumes that if citizens focus on the second, they will lose interest in 
the first.  But the distraction from politics can also be a curse because it allows 
someone questing for political power to rise to the helm, unnoticed by those 
busy tending shop.  In this example, the right to exclude can be transformed 
into the right not to be bothered by others, including those bearing news on the 
specter of tyranny.125  Perhaps the problem can be resolved by disbanding 
government altogether, but then the exercise of connecting property to 
democracy becomes irrelevant and meaningless.  Under the distraction theory, 
property would lead to anarchy governed by the discipline of the marketplace, 
rather than democratic governance. 
If the distraction theory is a meaningful theory of how property leads to 
democracy, then the distraction cannot lead to a complete blindness to politics.  
The distraction theory needs to be refined to allow for the integration of 
economics and politics.  Under this refinement of the distraction theory, 
property distracts citizens from the pursuit of power but not from the 
requirements of governance.  But psychologically and institutionally, it may be 
difficult to separate the pursuit of power from the pursuit of wealth.  
Intellectual property illustrates this point.  Many markets based on intellectual 
property are structured as winner-take-all markets, in which there are one or 
two individuals who obtain all the rents in the marketplace, while other 
 
 123. Rose, supra note 1, at 710. 
 124. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL 
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 69–70 (20th anniversary ed. 1997).  
Amartya Sen captures the distraction theory vividly as follows: 
[C]onsider a situation in which you are being chased by murderous bigots who 
passionately dislike something about you. . . . As they zero in on you, you throw some 
money around as you flee, and each of them gets down to the serious business of 
individually collecting the notes . . . . [T]he universalizing theorist would . . . note that this 
is only an example . . . of the general phenomenon of violent passion being subdued by 
innocuous interest in acquiring wealth. 
Amartya Sen, Foreword to HIRSCHMAN, supra at x.  Needless to say, this strategy is most 
effective when the target is particularly well-endowed with money to throw about. 
 125. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 105–23 (2001) (warning against the 
possible withdrawal of Internet users from the public sphere). 
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participants earn very little.126  The markets for blockbuster movies and books 
and pharmaceuticals illustrate this phenomenon.  Under this structure, the 
pursuit of wealth leads to wealth and power as resources become more 
concentrated.  Economics and politics may not be so easy to separate. 
The world of ideas and the subject of intellectual property provide 
countless examples of how the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power are 
in tandem.  Academic politics perhaps once was petty because the stakes were 
so low, but the profits to be earned as a star academic novelist, spokesperson, 
or celebrity have made the pursuit of position within academia arguably more 
savage and bitter.  If such anecdotes fall too close to home, recall Isaac 
Newton, who was not shy in using his power to sabotage colleagues and 
rivals.127  The point is not that all academics or even many academics are 
somehow rotten.  Rather, the assumption that the pursuit of power and the 
pursuit of wealth can be neatly separated can be readily contradicted in many 
instances, especially in ones where intellectual property plays a role.  Wealth is 
just power in another form and economics is politics by other means. 
A less nasty example than that of academic politics is provided by 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who was the plaintiff in a law suit against 
the manufacturer of a bobblehead doll in the his likeness.128  The manufacturer 
had made bobbleheads of other political figures without problem.129  The 
difference with the governor of California is that he was an actor, still is an 
actor, and most likely will be an actor when the flirtation with politics ends.130  
As a result, Schwarzenegger alleged that the bobblehead, a wry political 
commentary that portrayed the governor holding an assault rifle, infringed his 
rights of publicity in his image as an actor.131  The case was settled before it 
even went to trial with the manufacturer promising not to manufacture or 
distribute any more Schwarzenegger dolls holding a gun and to donate “a 
substantial portion of the sales” to the governor’s designated charity, Arnold’s 
All Stars.132  If the case had gone to trial, the court would have had to sort out 
the various aspects of the governor’s identity and publicity.  But the dispute 
illustrates the difficulties of separating politics from economics in a way that 
 
 126. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 
23–30 (1995) (explaining how winner-take-all markets arise); JAMES HEILBRUN & CHARLES M. 
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 127. See SIMON SINGH, BIG BANG: THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE 117–18 (2004) (describing 
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 128. See Tyler T. Ochoa, The Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Case: Introduction and Statement 
of Facts, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 547 (2005). 
 129. Id. at 551–52. 
 130. Id. at 549. 
 131. Id. at 552–54. 
 132. Id. at 555. 
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would satisfy the assumptions of the distraction theory.133  The right to exclude 
is a key element both in the pursuit of wealth and of politics, and one cannot 
presume how the right will be exercised. 
D. The Symbolism of Intellectual Property 
Property can serve as a symbol of stability, of commitment to individual 
initiative and civic engagement.  The symbolism of property, with its 
validation of the individual, is a precondition to democratic governance.  The 
symbolic theory of property has a peculiar application to intellectual property.  
The visibility of intellectual property institutions may indicate a commitment 
to creativity, innovation, and dynamism in the marketplace.  This commitment 
may in turn support a system of governance that is responsive to individual 
participation.  But the symbolism is perhaps belied by the realities of 
exclusivity.  This failure may arise in real property systems, under which the 
haves may be able to camouflage the have-nots, especially if property becomes 
the primary qualification of a citizen.  For intellectual property, the symbolism 
may be particularly confounding, sending the mixed message that individual 
expression and inventions are valued, while, at the same time, valuing some 
expression and invention more than others. 
Professor Rose points to the debate over traditional knowledge as a 
weakness to the symbolism theory.134  This example is appropriate.  
Intellectual property protection for traditional knowledge has been heralded as 
a means to empower indigenous groups both politically and economically.  
Both the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World 
Bank have released studies over the past five years documenting the actualities 
and the possibilities of traditional knowledge protection.135  The examples 
include the marketing of traditional folklore and handicrafts under the 
protection of intellectual property laws as part of the promotion of tourism or 
as export goods to developed countries.136  Intellectual property serves to 
 
 133. See Shubha Ghosh, On Bobbling Heads, Paparazzi, and Justice Hugo Black, 45 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 617, 637–41 (2005). 
 134. See Rose, supra note 1, at 715–16.  See generally MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS 
NATIVE CULTURE? 229–34 (2003) (discussing conflicting values in the property protection of the 
artifacts of traditional knowledge). 
 135. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, IDENTIFYING THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: 
RESULTS OF THE 9 FACT-FINDING MISSIONS (July 3, 2000), http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/ 
report/interim/pdf/7.pdf. See generally POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 
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(discussing promoting innovation, knowledge, and creative skills of poor people in developing 
countries). 
 136. See Frank J. Penna, Monique Thormann & J. Michael Finger, The Africa Music Project, 
in POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING 
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transform traditional knowledge into commodities, and this transformation also 
serves to assimilate the groups that produce these forms of knowledge into 
market and civic participants. 
But the symbolism needs to be confronted with the realities of both the 
legal system of intellectual property and the social system of ownership.  There 
appears to be a “let them sell cake” quality to the WIPO and World Bank 
reports.  While the reports express concern with integrating indigenous and 
other minority groups into civil society, the emphasis on selling knick-knacks, 
trinkets, and traditional music seems to fall short of a full-scale plan for 
assimilation.137  The protection of cultural artifacts may serve to validate 
groups that might meet certain conceptions of indigeneity or authenticity.138  
But such protection should include the full rights of citizenship, such as access 
to government services, education, and health care.  While there may not be 
evidence of these resources being denied, it would be hard to argue that 
protection for cultural heritage is somehow more important or even a precursor 
to protection of the broader rights of citizenship.139  Furthermore, there is a 
certain danger of majoritarianism that lurks behind the protection of cultural 
heritage.140  If we protect indigenous heritage, then why not also the heritage of 
the Irish, the British, the Italians, the French?  And if the goal of protecting 
indigenous heritage is to provide a voice in the political and market arenas, 
why would not this voice be muffled by the cacophony of every group’s 
heritage chasing after the scant attention, votes, and dollars in the political and 
economic marketplace? 
The confounding symbolism is illustrated most strikingly in the dispute 
over the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, legislation enacted by 
 
COUNTRIES, supra note 135, at  95, 108 (describing use of African music to encourage tourism); 
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Congress in 1998 that extended the term of copyright by twenty years for all 
works.141  The name of and the motivation for the legislation demonstrates the 
trouble with the symbolic theory of property.  Named after a former singer 
turned politician who died tragically, the Act suggests an inclination to help 
artists and creative forces in society.  In fact, the Act affected the copyrights of 
several prominent poets and songwriters whose works were about to enter into 
the public domain absent the extension.142  By singling out these interests, 
however, the Act also elevates the creative person, not as the instrument of 
democracy, but as an elite who needs the special protection of intellectual 
property law.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act against a constitutional challenge.143  
Justice Ginsburg, in her majority opinion, reasoned that Congress has broad 
latitude in extending the term of copyright since there is little or no quid pro 
quo from the copyright owner to society from the granting of the copyright.144  
Justices Stevens and Breyer, in dissent, reasoned otherwise, viewing copyright 
and other intellectual property as tools for social and economic progress, which 
reign in the legislative power of Congress.145  The tension between the 
majority and the dissent highlights the difficulty with the symbolic theory of 
property. Precisely what is it that is being symbolized?  The value of the 
creator, or the value of the creative process and its fruits for society? 
The symbolism of intellectual property is confounding because of the 
ambiguity of protecting creative and innovative individuals in society.  In the 
case of traditional knowledge, the symbolism seems to relegate certain groups 
to a specific position in the marketplace.  In the case of intellectual property 
legislation in the United States, it is not clear whether intellectual property 
protection is recognized in creative individuals because of their special status 
or because of their special contribution.  In both examples, the exclusivity of 
intellectual property has the potential to be destructive to democracy. 
 
 141. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 101-02, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
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 144. See id. at 217. 
 145. See id. at 223–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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E. Civilizing Influences and the Barbarism of the Anticommons 
Property can lead to propriety.  By recognizing property rights in all 
citizens, each citizen is given an instrument of self-governance that refines the 
personal and social skills of the property owner.146  The honing of these skills 
leads to greater civic engagement and participation in civil discourse.  Such is 
the tenor of the civilizing theory of property and democracy. 
As applied to intellectual property, there is a certain degree of logic to the 
civilizing theory.  Science and the invention process are regulated through the 
recognition of property rights.  Patents recognize the individual creator’s 
interest in his invention, and other inventors and users can license the invention 
as they see fit and as the patent owner allows.  Cross-licensing and blocking 
patents serve to negotiate the potential quagmire that occurs when patents in 
inventions conflict.147  The logic of the civilizing theory seems to be reflected 
in the relationship between copyright law and the First Amendment in the 
United States.  The historical and doctrinal argument is that copyright and the 
First Amendment complement each other.148  Copyright gives a speaker a right 
in her expression, which then allows the speaker to engage in the marketplace 
of ideas.  As with any market, property rights facilitate transaction.  
Furthermore, copyright allows anyone to participate in the marketplace of 
ideas by bringing to market original expression that can be exchanged with 
other speakers. 
The dangers of exclusivity are demonstrated quite starkly within the 
civilizing theory.  If the intellectual property owner is granted too broad a right 
to exclude, potential exchange can be stifled.  Patent owners attempt to extend 
the scope of their grant and sometimes even collude to control the 
marketplace.149  When these activities become too egregious, antitrust law can 
provide a remedy.  Nonetheless, despite the potential cure of antitrust law, the 
point remains that intellectual property may work against the demands of civil 
society.  In the marketplace of ideas, copyright can act to inhibit speech as 
copyright owners seek to enjoin speakers who allegedly copy or create 
adaptations of protected work.150  Once again, there are potential limits on the 
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ability of the copyright owner to control the marketplace of ideas.  But the 
point remains that property may potentially inhibit the civilizing influence as 
much as it may promote it.  Propriety may require limits on property. 
F. Summary 
In this section, I have used intellectual property as a lens through which to 
scrutinize the five political theories for property presented by Professor Rose.  
Each theoretical justification for property has to confront the problem of 
exclusivity, a contentious issue for intellectual property.  The key lesson is that 
there needs to be limits on property rights in order to reach the goals of 
democracy.  In the next section, I distill this key lesson into several discrete 
ones for understanding the relationship between property and democracy. 
IV.  DISTILLING THREE LESSONS 
“No one is in charge of a market—or, rather, everyone is in charge.”151  
This statement by economist John McMillan captures the attractiveness of 
markets as a tool for facilitating democracy.  By permitting the decision-
making autonomy that is the hallmark of markets, the institution of property, it 
is argued, is also the linchpin of democracy.  The relationship between 
intellectual property and democracy is riddled by the academic and popular 
skepticism as to intellectual property’s status as property.  I have suggested 
that perhaps intellectual property theorists can get off the analyst’s couch with 
the new-found sense that the object of their study is property after all.  But this 
certainty of identity comes at the expense of altering the meaning of property 
itself. 
Professor Rose offers a very helpful political theory of property within 
which intellectual property can be contained.  But once the relationship 
between intellectual property and democracy is seen, the source of the problem 
of why democracy may not inevitably flow from the establishment of property 
rights can also be better understood.  If property rights are drawn too broadly, 
permitting too much exclusivity, then democracy will be sacrificed.  From the 
perspective of legal reform and institutional design, exclusivity is the problem 
that needs to be addressed.  I would like to end the analysis of this Paper with 
three lessons that I hope can guide future scholarly and policy discussion about 
property rights, democracy, and intellectual property. 
The three lessons are the following.  First, markets should not be pursued 
at the expense of other institutions.  Second, the institution of property is most 
effective when designed with limits on the right to exclude, implemented either 
from outside property law or within property law.  Third, whether property-
rights systems lead to democracy rests largely on the ability to limit 
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concentrations of economic and political power and to permit participation.  
The principal conclusion from these lessons is that property institutions must 
be designed appropriately in order to foster democracy. 
Professor Rose’s provocative question and equally provocative response 
forces us to rethink property and to reconstruct intellectual property.  The 
“dazzling abstraction” is given some degree of concreteness through the 
typologies presented in the paper, which demonstrate the many ways in which 
property is used and conceived.  The danger is in designing property as an 
exclusionary mechanism that emphasizes one of the categories in the typology 
over the others.  The example of intellectual property shows the breadth of the 
political theory of property and the need to avoid becoming dazzled by an 
abstraction that can so easily become fatal to our democratic ideals. 
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